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The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings
In two recent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized a first
amendment right of access to criminal trials. 1 Dissenting in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court ,2 Chief Justice Burger noted the
"disturbing paradox" that states may mandate closure of juvenile delinquency proceedings to protect a seventeen-year-old accused of
rape, but may not mandate closure of part of a criminal trial to protect a minor witness who has been raped or otherwise sexually
abused. Proper resolution of this paradox, however, may lie not in
closing ,the criminal courtroom, but in opening the juvenile courtroom. Juvenile court judges in most states are required or routinely
permitted to exclude the general public from juvenile delinquency
hearings.3 The Supreme Court's recent recognition of the right to
l. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982); Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
2. 102 S. Ct. at 2623 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
3. The juvenile court statutes of 27 states provide that the general public shall be excluded
from juvenile delinquency hearings, but give the court discretion to allow entry to those with a
direct or proper interest in the case or in the work of the court: ALA. CODE § 12-15-65(a)
(1975); .ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(e) (1981); 0A. CODE
ANN. § 24A-1801(c) (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 571-41 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1813 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-20(6) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); KY. REV,
STAT.§ 208A.l 10 (1982); LA. CODE Juv. PROC. art. 69 (West 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 65 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 260.155(1) (West 1982); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 43-23-15 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT. § 211.171(5) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT,
§ 62.193(1) (1981); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 169:20 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-24(5)
(Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT.§ 419.498(1) (1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT, ANN,§ 6336(d) (Purdon
1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-30 (1970); s.c. CODE ANN. § 20-7-755 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1982); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-3a-33 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 651(c) (1981); VA. CODE
§ 16.1-302 (1982); WASH. REv. CODE§ 13-34.110 (1981);
VA. CODE§ 49-5-l(d) (Supp.
1980); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.31(5) {West 1979); WYO. STAT.§ 14-6-224(b) (1978).
The juvenile court statutes of 15 states give the court discretion to exclude the general
public, or provide for open hearings unless the court finds that a closed hearing better serves
the interests of the child or of justice: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-442 (1977); COLO. Rev. STAT,
§ 19-1-107(2) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.09(l)(c) (West Supp. 1981); IND. CODE§ 31-5-7-15
(1976); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 232.39 (West Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 38-822 (1981); Mo.
CTS. & Juo. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-812(e) (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN, § 712A.17(1)
(Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1-31(B) (Supp. 1981); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 74l(b) (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-629 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page
Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1111 (West Supp. 1981); TENN, CODE ANN. § 37224(d) (1977); Tex. FAM. Cooe ANN.§ 54.08 (Vernon 1975).
Two state juvenile court statutes require juvenile delinquency hearings for certain serious
offenses to be open to the general public, and give the court discretion as to the other hearings.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 972(a) (1975); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-521(5) (1981). California
provides for public access to juvenile hearings for certain serious offenses, but allows the victim to close such hearings. The general public is excluded from the remaining delinquency
hearings, except that the court has discretion to admit those directly interested in the case or
court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 676(a) (West Supp. 1981). Maine opens juvenile hearings
for certain serious offenses, and closes the remaining delinquency hearings. ME, Rev. STAT,
ANN. tit. 15, § 3307(2) (Supp. 1982). South Dakota opens all of its juvenile hearings to the
public, unless the child or his representative requests that the hearing be private. The court
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attend criminal trials, however, casts doubt on the constitutionality
of excluding the public from juvenile delinquency hearings. 4
Despite the differences between the criminal and juvenile court
systems, 5 the Supreme Court has extended many criminal procedural safeguards to juvenile delinquency hearings. 6 The Court does
not, however, "automatically and preemptorily" apply every procedural safeguard to juvenile hearings; rather, it carefully examines the
criminal trial standard in the context of delinquency hearings.7
Adopting a similar approach, this Note considers the implications of
a constitutional right of access to juvenile delinquency hearings.
may then admit interested persons, court officers, and the news media. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 26-8-32 (1976).
The juvenile judge is not the only person who may open juvenile delinquency hearings in
some states. The following statutes extend the right to a public trial to juvenile offenders:
ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.070 (1979); LA. CODE Juv. PROC. art. 69 (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-629 (1981); OR. REv. STAT.§ 419.498(1) (1981); VA. CODE§ 16.1-302 (1982); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.31(5) (West 1979) (juvenile has right to a public hearing unless victim of alleged
sexual assault or the juvenile's parent or guardian objects). Other statutes provide for the
admission to juvenile court hearings of persons whose presence is requested by the minor, the
parents or guardian, or any party: ALA. CODE§ 12-15-65(a) (1975); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 676(a) (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 19-1-107(2) (1978); HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 57141 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-3a-33 (1977); w. VA. CODE§ 49-5-l(d) (Supp. 1980).
Four states have not enacted legislation that provides rules for attendance at juvenile delinquency hearings: Arizona, Connecticut, Nebraska, and New Jersey.
This survey of modem juvenile court legislation reveals that no state extends the public
right of access to criminal trials to juvenile delinquency hearings.
4. This Note will discuss juvenile court adjudication hearings in which the juvenile is accused of an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. This is the type of
juvenile court proceeding that most closely resembles a criminal trial. It should be noted that
the jurisdiction of most juvenile courts extends to many areas beyond the scope of this Note.
Some examples are cases of noncriminal misbehavior by juveniles, such as truancy, running
away, or incorrigibility; cases of parental neglect or abuse; and cases of adults charged with
contributing to the delinquency of a minor. This Note also excludes juvenile court hearings
other than those to adjudicate delinquency: detention hearings, hearings to determine a minor's fitness to be tried as an adult, and dispositional hearings. See generally OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1980) (discussing the full range of
judicial activities affecting youth in the context of recommending a comprehensive set of
standards).
5. See notes 36-40 iefra and accompanying text.
6. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) (juvenile court hearings "must
measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment"). Since the Kent decision, the
Court has specified some of these "essentials" in the context of delinquency adjudication hearings. They include the requirement of timely notice of the proceedings, the right to counsel,
the right of confrontation and examination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), added the requirement that
delinquency be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), applied the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to juvenile court adjudicatory
hearings.
7. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,541 (1971). InMcKeiver, the Court held that
trial by jury in the juvenile courts' adjudicative stage is not constitutionally required. This
holding is consistent with the Court's earlier statement that juvenile hearings need not conform
to "all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing."
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 562.
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Part I examines the right of access announced in Globe Newspaper
and Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia .8 Part II looks at the juvenile
justice system and argues that extension of the right of access to juvenile hearings promotes the first amendment's underlying purposes.
Part III analyzes the state's interests in confidential juvenile proceedings and preventing public identification of the juvenile offender.
This Part argues that states may not mandate or routinely permit
exclusion of the public from the juvenile courtroom. The juvenile
court judge may, however, limit access to his courtroom when justified by an overriding state interest.
l.

THE PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO CRIMINAL TRIALS

In Richmond Newspapers, 9 a fragmented Supreme Court 10 recognized for the first time a constitutional 11 right of the public and the
press 12 to attend criminal trials. This right, however, is not absolute;
8. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
9. Richmond Newspapers arose out of a defendant's fourth trial for murder: his first conviction was reversed because evidence had been improperly admitted, and his next two trials
ended in mistrials. 448 U.S. at 559. The trial judge closed the proceedings to the press and
public after the defense counsel moved for closure, and the prosecutor did not object. 448 U.S.
at 559-60. The newspaper company moved to vacate the closure order, and the trial court
denied the motion. 448 U.S. at 560-61. The newspaper company then appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court, which denied the appeal. 448 U.S. at 562. The United States Supreme
Court granted the newspaper company's petition for certiorari, and reversed. 448 U.S. at 56381.
10. The Court produced seven opinions. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White
and Stevens, wrote a plurality opinion. 448 U.S. at 558. Justices White and Stevens also filed
separate concurrences. 448 U.S. at 581 (White, J., concurring), 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment, 448 U.S.
at 584, as did Justices Stewart and Blackmun. 448 U.S. at 598 (Stewart, J., concurring), 448
U.S. at 601 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist dissented. 448 U.S. at 604. Justice
Powell did not participate in the decision.
11. The Court considered and rejected a sixth amendment public right to attend pretrial
suppression hearings in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, 443 U.S. at 370-94, concluded that the sixth amendment's guarantee
of a public trial is for the defendant alone. Members of the public thus have no enforceable
sixth amendment right to a public trial that can be asserted ip.dependently of the parties in the
litigation. 443 U.S. at 379-91. Justice Stewart explicitly refused to decide whether the first
amendment gives the public and press a right of access to pretrial hearings. Moreover, he
found that "the actions of the trial judge here were consistent with any right of access the
petitioner may have had under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 443 U.S. at 392.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, concurred in part and
dissented in part. These Justices found a sixth amendment public right of access to trials and
suppression hearings, but reserved the issue of a first amendment access right. 443 U.S. at 40648 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Powell explicitly found a
first amendment right of access to courtroom proceedings. 443 U.S. at 397-403 (Powell, J.,
concurring). Justice Rehnquist explicitly denied any right of access to judicial or other governmental proceedings. 443 U.S. at 403-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
12. The plurality found that the rights of the press were coextensive with the public's right
of access. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73 (plurality opinion). This finding follows
the Court's holding in the prison access cases. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)
(plurality opinion); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834-35 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post,
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974). Justice Brennan, however, believes that the question whether the
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a trial judge may close a criminal trial if "an overriding interest articulated in findings" 13 outweighs the public's right of access. As
with other first amendment guarantees, the right to attend criminal
trials is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. 14
Two years later, Globe Newspaper "extended, or at least read
generously, Richmond Newspapers ." 15 The Court held that a state
mandatory closure statute, which closed the courtroom during the
testimony of a minor victim in a sexual offense trial, violated the
public's right to attend criminal trials. 16 Justice Brennan, writing for
the Globe majority, stated that although the right of access is not
absolute, the circumstances justifying exclusion of the public and the
press from criminal trials are limited. The state must show "that the
denial [of access] is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 17 The trial court
must balance the state's interest in closure against the public's first
amendment right of access on a case-by-case basis. Thus, a
mandatory courtroom closure rule is inappropriate, as the strength of
the state's interest will vary with the circumstances of each case. 18
The Supreme Court offers two broad justifications for a public
right of access to criminal trials. First, it identifies the first amendment's structural role in securing and fostering a republican form of
press has greater access rights than the public remains open. 448 U.S. at 586 n.2 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
13. 448 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion).
14. 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court has consistently held that
activities protected by the first amendment are subject to reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions. Such restrictions "may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of
speech" and must "serve a significant governmental interest." See Heffron v. International
Socy. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648-49 (1981) (citations omitted) (upholding as
a reasonable place and manner restriction a Minnesota State Fair rule confining the sales and
solicitation activities of Krishna religion members to a fixed location); see also Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (sustaining as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation a local ordinance forbidding disturbing noises in the vicinity of a building in which a
school is in session); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding the application of a
local trespass law to people demonstrating on city jail grounds); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949) (sustaining a local ordinance against the emission of loud and raucous noises on public
streets as applied to a sound truck); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding a
local ordinanr.e forbidding street parades without a license).
15. Kamisar, Globe Newspaper: The Court Balks at Mandatory Closure Rules - Even for
Spectfic Testimony, in 4 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR, & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 1981-82, at 121, 123 (1983). Professor Kamisar explained that Richmond
Newspapers could have been read to prohibit only trial closures in toto. Thus, temporary
privacy for specific testimony (which was at issue in Globe Newspaper) would be permissible.
Alternatively, the Court could have refused to extend the right of access to the facts of Globe
Newspaper,see text at note 16 infra, due to the absence of an unbroken history of openness in
cases involving the sexual abuse of minors. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
16. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2622 (1982).
17. 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
18. 102 S. Ct. at 2621.
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government. I 9 The "core purpose" of the first amendment20 is to
ensure that members of a democracy obtain information they need
to govern themselves effectively.2 I Open criminal trials fulfill this
structural role by educating the public about the legal system. 22
Such information promotes informal discussions about governmental affairs, instills confidence in the fair administration of justice,23
and inspires respect for the rule of law. 24 Criminal trials, moreover,
are the main source of information about "U]udges, prosecutors, and
police officials [who] often are elected or are subject to some control
19. See Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2620; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960). Meiklejohn believed that selfgovernment is the essence of our political system. We as citizen-governors must have access to
all information relevant to our political decisions. To ensure this success, Meiklejohn advocated an absolute first amendment protection for "political speech":
[The First Amendment] does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take
part in public debate. . . . What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said. . . .
... [C]onflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed, not because they are
valid, but because they are relevant. If they are responsibly entertained by anyone, we,
the voters, need to hear them. [T]o be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for selfgovernment. Any such suppression of ideas about the co=on good, the First Amendment condemns with its absolute disapproval.
Id. at 26-28.
Meiklejohn's views have profoundly influenced the Supreme Court's view of the first
amendment. Professor Kalven has asserted that the Supreme Court essentially adopted
Meiklejohn's thesis in the watershed freedom of the press case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Nole on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. RE.v. 191, 209. Justice Brennan has apparently endorsed Kalven's view of the case. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. RE.v. I (1965). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (applying the Meiklejohn thesis to the area of
broadcast regulation); Bollinger, Elitism, the Masses and the Idea ofSe!f-Governmenl: Ambh•a•
fence About the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment", in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERN·
MENT IN AMERICA 99 (R. Collins ed. 1980). Professor Bollinger writes that "[t]oday it is
widely assumed that Meiklejohn's theory is predominant in our First Amendment thinking•
. • ." Id. at 99. However, he concludes that "the Meiklejohn view does not have such an
exclusive hold on our legal doctrine as many appear to believe, or would have us believe." Id.
at 106. Professor Bollinger finds first amendment theory to be an uneasy combination of two
ideas: the Meiklejohn view that the first amendment should absolutely protect the flow of
information to rational citizen-governors, and an elitist view that the first amendment allows
government to shield citizens from harmful or unduly persuasive information.
21. See Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2620; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575; see
also Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting) (notes "the
societal function of the First Amendment in preserving free public discussion of governmental
affairs. No aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more rightly treasured than its protection
of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider and resolve their own
destiny.").
22. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion).
23. See Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2620; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-72
(plurality opinion).
24. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570-72 (plurality opinion), 594-95 (Brennan, J,,
concurring).
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by elected officials."25 If citizens are to make intelligent decisions
concerning the judicial syst~m, they must be able to observe and
communicate about the criminal trial process.26
Similarly, the first amendment fulfills its structural role in securing a republican form of government by checking abuses of official
power.27 Public officials who participate in criminal trials -judges,
prosecutors, and police officers - are often vested with wide discretion in performing their duties. 28 Abuse of their power, moreover,
can seriously harm both the individuals before the court and society
at large.29 Subjecting criminal trials "to contemporaneous review in
the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse
of judicial power."30
Second, the Richmond Newspapers plurality relies heavily on the
"unbroken, uncontradicted history" of open criminal trials to find a
first amendment right of access.31 The Globe Newspaper majority
agreed that the history of open criminal trials supports recognition of
25. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,428 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
26. One commentator recently suggested a different justification for public access to government held information:
Not only does the public need information to exercise its responsibilities of citizenship,
but, in a most fundamental sense, data in the hands of government belongs to the public,
having been collected through use of taxpayers' money and by the exercise of authority
derived from the people as a whole. For government officials to hold back material from
those to whom it belongs, without exceptionally good reason, is the height of
presumptuousness.
F. ffAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 368-69 (1981).
27. See Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2620; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 (plurality opinion), 596 (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 521. Professor Blasi explains that selfimportant public officials, enjoying relative i=unity from public skepticism and occupying
positions of power, can inflict serious damage unless their behavior is regulated by public
scrutiny. Id. at 540-41. He argues that restrictions on access to information about official
behavior should be upheld only if the restrictions substantially promote an important government objective that cannot be achieved by less restrictive alternatives. Id. at 609.
28. For general accounts of the role of discretion in the administration of justice, see K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); E. LEVI, THE USE OF DISCRETION IN THE LEGAL
SYSTEM (1978). For accounts of the discretion of judges and police officers, see K. DAVIS,
POLICE DISCRETION (1975); W. GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING
(1974); T. LEE & B. OVERTON, JUDICIAL DISCRETION (1974). For a comprehensive list of
cases and comments about prosecutorial discretion, see Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1540 n.71 (1981); Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate Process: Due Process Protection After United States v. Goodwin,
81 MICH. L. REv. 194, 194 n.3 (1982).
29. For descriptions of abuse of judicial, police, and prosecutorial discretion and its disastrous consequences, see K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 12-14, 25-26, 52-96, 162-214
(1969); K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 143-44 (1975); w. GAYLIN,supra note 28, at 28-44, 182233; Note, supra note 28, at 195 n.5.
30. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
31. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 573. The Chief Justice's thorough summary of the
relevant history begins with a discussion of''the days before the Norman Conquest," 448 U.S.
at 565, and continues through to the present. 448 U.S. at 574.
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a constitutional right to attend criminal trials. 32 Yet, in striking
down the Massachusetts mandatory plosure statute, 33 the Globe
Newspaper majority ignored "a long history of exclusion of the public from trials involving sexual assaults, particularly those against
minors."34 Thus, although the Court relied heavily on historical
analysis to establish a first amendment right of access, history may
play a more limited role in determining the scope of that right.
The Supreme Court has not yet determined the scope of the right
articulated in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper. Although both cases involved access to criminal trials, the Court's reasoning may suggest a constitutional right of access to other types of
judicial proceedings. 35 The next two sections of this Note apply the
reasoning of Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper to juvenile
court proceedings and conclude that the first amendment protects
the right of the public to attend juvenile delinquency hearings.
32. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2619.
33. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 1980).
34. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2624 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35. In his plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Chief Justice Burger hinted that the
public right of access to criminal trials extends to civil trials as well: "Whether the public has a
right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open." 448 U.S. at 580 n.17. See
also Kamisar, supra note 15, at 128 (stating that Professors Choper, Kamisar, and Tribe concluded from studying the various opinions in Richmond that the right of access probably extends to civil trials). But see Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2623 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I
interpret neither Richmond Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any implications outside the context of criminal trials.").
The Third Circuit has extended the Richmond Newspapers public right of access to pretrial
suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings. See United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550,
554-57 (3d Cir. 1982). The court based its decision on the current societal interests that are
enhanced by access, rather than the history of the proceedings. As the pretrial hearings were
relatively new and had "grown immensely" in importance in the past two hundred years, the
court found the historical analysis portion of the Richmond Newspapers opinions to be irrelevant. 675 F.2d at 555. However, the California Supreme Court took the opposite approach in
San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court, 30 Cal. 3d 498, 638 P.2d 655, 179 Cal. Rptr. 772
(1982). The court upheld§ 868 of the California Criminal Code, which mandated closure of
the preliminary examination of criminal defendants upon the defendant's request. CAL, PENAL CODE § 868 (West 1970). The state legislature subsequently amended § 868 to permit
exclusion of the public only when the defendant requests and the magistrate finds that such
"exclusion ... is necessary in order to protect the defendant's right to a fair and impartial
trial." CAL. PENAL CODE§ 868 (West Supp. 1983); see Kamisar, supra note 15, at 13 I. However, "the case is still a significant precedent on the meaning of the First Amendment 'right of
access.'" Id. Moreover, three other states mandate closure of the preliminary hearing upon
the defendant's request: IDAHO CODE § 19-811 (1979); IOWA CODE § 813.2 Rule (2)(4)(d)
(1981); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 46-10-201 (1981). In Professor Kamisar's opinion, these statutes
are unconstitutional. See Kamisar, supra.
Although the Supreme Court rejected a sixth amendment public right of access to pretrial
suppression hearings in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), this decision probably does not limit the Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper right of access. Justice
Stewart's majority opinion reserved the first amendment issue, but went on to state that the
case did not present a violation of any first amendment access right. See note 11 supra. However, the Gannett decision generated confusion almost from the moment it was handed down.
See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 602 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper decisions fail to reveal what, if anything, remains of Gannett.
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BENEFITS OF ACCESS TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The juvenile court system, established in most states shortly after
the tum of the century,36 was the product of a broad reform movement to improve the welfare of children. Reformers wanted to remove children from the adult criminal system, which focused on
determining guilt and administering punishment. 37 Instead, the
youthful offender would be "taken in hand by the state, not as an
enemy but as a protector"38 in a nonadversarial proceeding. The
juvenile court judge, acting "as a wise and merciful father handl[ing]
his own child,"39 would decide each case according to the offender's
individual needs. 40 Thus, the juvenile court system would reform,
rather than punish, young offenders.
But "there is a gap between the originally benign conception of
the system and its realities."41 Currently, juvenile delinquency hearings closely resemble adult criminal proceedings. First, the two
court systems share the primary goal of protecting the community
from dangerous and disturbing behavior.42 The juvenile court sys36. During the early part of United States history, children above seven years of age were
arrested and tried as adults. Children under seven were considered incapable of possessing
criminal intent. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L.
REV. 104, 106 (1909).
The first juvenile court statute was adopted in 1899. 1899 ILL. LAWS 131. By 1917,juvenile
courts had been established in all but three states. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 7 (1960), cited in Co=ent, .Delinquency Hearings and
the First Amendment: Reassessing Juvenile Court Co,!fidentiality Upon the .Demise of "Conditional Access," 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 123, 126 n.8 (1979).
37. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1967) (recounting the history of the reform movement); F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46 (1964); Mack, supra note 36.
The Supreme Court views the reform movement as a response to the need for procedural
reform: "The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalities, and by the
fact that children could be given long prison sentences . . . ." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15. At
least one co=entator, however, argues that the need for sending juvenile offenders to institutions other than prisons, rather than procedural reforms, lay at the heart of the reform movement. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1187,
1120-21 (1970).
38. Mack, supra note 36, at 107.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., D. MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 114-15 (1964) ("The ijuvenile court]
principle of individualized justice suggests that disposition is to be guided by a full understanding of the client's personal and social character and by his 'individual needs.'") (emphasis in
original).
41. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975).
42. See F. ALLEN, supra note 37, at 53:
[I]t is . . . both inaccurate and deceptive to describe the operation of the juvenile court in
this area as the exercise of a rehabilitative or therapeutic function. . . . The primary
function being served in these cases . . . is the temporary incapacitation of children found
to constitute a threat to the co=unity's interest. . . . In a great many cases the juvenile
court must perform functions essentially similar to those exercised by any court adjudicating cases of persons charged with dangerous and disturbing behavior.
See also UNITED STATES TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT] ("While statutes, judges, and co=entators still talk the language of compassion, help,
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tem is not essentially therapeutic and rehabilitative in nature.
Rather, like the criminal justice system, the juvenile courts act in the
offender's interest only to the extent that such efforts are compatible
with the safety and security of the community.43
Second, the consequences of an adjudication of delinquency can
be as severe as a criminal conviction. Some states permit incarceration of juvenile delinquents in adult prisons,44 and all juvenile courts
may commit juvenile offenders to some institution.45 The Supreme
Court has found that such commitments are the practical and constitutional equivalent of incarceration in prison.46 Further, an adjudication of delinquency, often as serious as a criminal conviction,47
haunts the offender after his release. The FBI, the military, governand treatment, it has become clear that in fact the same purposes that characterize the use of
the criminal law for adult offenders - retribution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation
- are involved in the disposition of juvenile offenders too.").
43. See F. ALLEN,.rupra note 37, at 51-56; TASK FORCE REPORT,.rupra note 42, at 9. The
TASK FORCE REPORT observed that the "guiding consideration" for the juvenile court is protection of the safety of a community. Rehabilitating offenders through individualized handling is one means to secure this goal.
44. Courts in Maine and Ohio have held that juvenile delinquents may be incarcerated in
adult correctional facilities. See Morton v. Hayden, 142 A.2d 37 (Me. 1958); Gerak v. State, 22
Ohio App. 357, 153 N.E.2d 902 (1920); see also Wilson v.- Coughlin, 259 Iowa 1163, 147
N.W.2d 175 (1966) (sustaining the transfer of a sixteen-year-old from a youth training school
to the state men's reformatory, as reformatory was only place of custody which could provide
proper care and training); In re Parker, 225 Pa. Super. 217, 310 A.2d 414 (1973) (sustaining
commitment of a juvenile to an adult correctional facility, but ordering the adult facility to
provide separate accommodations for the juvenile); In re Society for Prevention of Crime, Inc.,
183 Misc. 595, 49 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1944) (upholding commitment of juvenile delinquents to city
prison pending acceptance by, and transportation to, the state training school for boys).
45. It is true that juvenile courts may confine the juvenile offender only until he reaches the
age of majority, which is 18 in some states and 21 in others. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 45406.1 (Supp. 1981) (18 years old); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 712A.5 (Supp. 1982) (18 years
old); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-6 {Supp. 1982) (21 years old); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-849.1 (Supp. 1982) (21 years old). Bui see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 607 {West Supp. 1982)
(jurisdiction of juvenile court continues until offenders committed to the Youth Authority
reach 23 years of age). However, this confinement can exceed the maximum statutory sentence
for adults committing the same offense. The court observed in In re Gault that "(f]or the
particular offense immediately involved, the maximum punishment would have been a fine of
$5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months. Instead, [the juvenile) was
committed to custody for a maximum of six years." 387 U.S. 1, 29 (1966).
46. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) {footnotes omitted):
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an
"industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is
incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes "a building with
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours . . . ." Instead of mother
and father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by
guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents" confined with him for anything
from waywardness to rape and homicide.
47. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) {noting the stigma and possibility of confinement resulting from an appearance before the juvenile court); In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36
(juvenile delinquency proceedings are "comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution"). A
Vermont court observed that "[i)t is true that convicted adults may serve long terms of imprisonment, whereas juveniles cannot be held beyond age eighteen. Often, however, where the
delinquency is for a misdemeanor, the confinement for a juvenile is potentially longer than the
maximum statutory sentences" for adults. In re Certain Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 7

May 1983]

Note -

Access to Juvenile .Delinquency Hearings

1549

ment agencies, and private employers are able to obtain information
about a juvenile's past court contacts.48 In short, the term "delinquent" has "come to involve only slightly less stigma than the term
'criminal' applied to adults."49
The juvenile justice system of today bears little resemblance to
the one contemplated by the early reformers. Although theory and
practice often diverge, the contrast is striking in the context of the
juvenile justice system:
In theory the juvenile court was to be helpful and rehabilitative
rather than punitive. In fact the distinction often disappears, not only
because of the absence of facilities and personnel but also because of
the limits of knowledge and technique. In theory the court's action
was to affix no stigmatizing label. In fact a delinquent is generally
viewed by employers, schools, the armed services - by society generally - as a criminal. In theory the court was to treat children guilty of
criminal acts in noncriminal ways. In fact it labels truants and runaways as junior criminals.50

In light of the similarities between the juvenile and criminal justice
systems, the first amendment should view the juvenile courtroom
and the criminal courtroom alike. 51
Access to juvenile delinquency hearings, like access to criminal
trials, fulfills the first amendment's structural role in securing a republican form of government.52 First, public attendance at juvenile
delinquency hearings will promote "free public discussion of government affairs." 53 The public has a deep interest in the juvenile system,54 which bears the responsibility for meeting the "single most
pressing and threatening aspect of the [American] crime problem."55
MEDIAL. REP. (BNA) 1740, 1743-44 (Vt. Dist. Ct., Chittenden Cir. July 8, 1981), revd sub
nom. In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458, 438 A.2d 112S (1981).
48. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24-2S (1967). The Court noted that most juvenile judges
have discretionary authority to disclose court records, and that many of them release records
routinely or upon request. More importantly, many police departments release their juvenile
arrest records upon request. In addition, some private employers word their application forms
to produce information about past juvenile court involvement. See also Lemert, The Juvenile
Court- Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 93 (''.Employers denied information from juvenile courts often get the desired facts from the police.").
49. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-24.
so. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 9.
Sl. But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. S28, S41 (1971) ("(.T]he juvenile court
proceeding has not yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach
of the Sixth Amendment . . .").
S2. See notes 19-30 supra and accompanying text.
53. Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at S73 n.9 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(" 'the public have a deep interest in trials'") (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,
361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
SS. TASK FORCE REPoRT, supra note 42, at 1. Juvenile crime is a huge problem in the
United States. The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime reported that in 1979
juveniles up to 18 years old accounted for about 20% of all violent crime arrests, 44% of all
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Suppression of information relating to the performance of the juvenile courts prevents the public from making informed decisions
about both the reform and the administration of the juvenile justice
system. The current .financial crisis facing the juvenile system, for
example, is due in part to public ignorance about the system's
problems. 56 Juvenile court judges, moreover, are usually elected to
the bench.57 Access to juvenile court hearings would permit the public to evaluate the judge's performance, thus enabling citizens to cast
their votes intelligently. In short, access to the juvenile courtroom
would provide the public with the information it needs to exercise
rationally its control over the juvenile justice system.
Second, access to juvenile delinquency hearings would function
as a check58 on the abuse of power by judges, probation officers, 59
and other public officials. The nature of the juvenile justice system,
even more than the criminal system, suggests a compelling need to
check the exercise of government power. Juvenile court judges, for
example, exercise more discretion than their criminal trial counterparts. 60 Under the juvenile court's philosophy of individualized justice, 61 the juvenile's character and needs, rather than his offense,
~uide disposition of the case. 62 Such a system relies heavily on subJective judgments,63 making the "compliant, biased, or eccentric
serious property crime arrests, and 39% of overall serious crime arrests. If juveniles in the 18to 20-year range are included, the figures are 38% of all violent crime arrests, 62% of all serious
property crime arrests, and 57% of all serious crime arrests. Moreover, only 3 to IS% of delinquent acts result in a police contact. A representative sample of delinquent males admitted to
committing from 8 to 11 serious crimes for each time they were arrested. See U.S. DEPT, OF
JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT 81 (1981).
56. See D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY (1974) (noting the juvenile court's
relative isolation from the community); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 7, 38 (lowlevel of information flowing to the public may explain why society has not adequately funded
the juvenile justice system); Conway, Publicizing the Juvenile Court: A Public Responsibility, 16
Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 21, 22-24 (196S) (The lack of adequate funding is due to the public's
ignorance about the juvenile court. The system's inadequate financial resources undermine its
philosophy of individualized care for juvenile offenders. ''The juvenile court idea will only be
tried . . . when the people are aware of the deficiencies in services and in personnel in the
juvenile courts").
57. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 6.
S8. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
59. ''The juvenile court judge's right-hand man is the probation officer." TASK FORCE
REPORT,supra note 42, at 6. The probation officer is responsible for "making social studies of
cases referred to the court and supervising juveniles placed on probation." Id.
60. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 5 ("Most juvenile court judges have broad
discretion in disposing of cases, being empowered to dismiss the case, warn the juvenile, fine
him, place him on probation, arrange for restitution, refer him to an agency or treatment facility, or commit him to an institution.").
61. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
62. See D. MATZA,supra note 40, at 111-18.
63. Matza calls the juvenile court "a system of rampant discretion." D. MATZA, supra note
40, at I 16. · This may change in the near future. There is some evidence of a recent trend
toward juvenile court dispositions "commensurate with the seriousness of the offense commit•
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judge"64 a particular hazard. Juvenile court judges, moreover, are
often less qualified and less competent than other judges.65 As a result, juvenile courts often commit "much more extensive and fundamental error than is generally found in adult criminal cases." 66
Because juvenile cases are only rarely appealed, 67 public scrutiny of
the juvenile justice system takes on added importance as a check
against official misconduct. Finally, judges, not juries, decide most
delinquency cases. 68 Thus, the juvenile is unable to appeal to the
community conscience, as embodied in the jury, to protect against
abuse of government power.69 The Supreme Court's refusal to exted." E. SCHUR, INTERPRETING DEVIANCE 467 (1979). Schur attributes this trend to a desire
to improve the "predictability, consistency, and fairness" of juvenile court outcomes.
64. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
65. A 1973 study revealed that 86.4% of judges with juvenile jurisdiction devote half of
their time or less to juvenile matters, and 66.7% spend one quarter of their time or less. More
than ten percent of juvenile court judges did not attend law school, and only 85.6% have been
admitted to the bar. In towns with populations of 10,000 or less, 31.4% of the juvenile court
judges indicated that they had not been admitted to the bar. See Smith, A Profile of Juvenile
Court Judges in the United States, Juv. JUST., Aug. 1974, at 27, 32-33.
66. RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971) (footnote omitted) (reversing adjudications
of delinquency because the juvenile was not present at the hearing).
67. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 5.
68. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 548 (1971) (over 30 jurisdictions deny by
statute the right to a jury trial). Fourteen states give juvenile offenders the right to a trial by
jury. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(4) (1978); KAN. STAT.
ANN.§ 38-808(a) (1981) Gudge may order jury trial in cases involving certain felonies); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § SSA (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 712A.17(2) (Supp. 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-23-15 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5521(1) (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-l-31A (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IO, § 1110 (West
Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§ 26-8-31 (1976) (court may order trial by jury); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN.§ 54.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE§ 49-5-6 (Supp. 1975); WIS.
STAT. ANN.§ 48.31(2) (West Supp. 1982); WYo. STAT. § 14-6-224(a) (Supp. 1982).
69. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554-57 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) Guvenile hearings contain adequate safeguards against improper
Judicial behavior only when they are open to the public or when they include trial by jury).
Some authorities have suggested that recognizing a minor's right to demand a public trial
would satisfy the goals of fair juvenile proceedings and open information for the public. See
STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 328-29
(1980) [hereinafter cited as NAC STANDARDS]; INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARD RELATING
TO ADJUDICATION 70-72 (Tent. Draft 1977) [hereinafter cited as IJA/ABA STANDARDS]; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION 380-81 (1976) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
STANDARDS]. However, the public trial right is not a satisfactory substitute for a public right
of access. The right to a jury trial relies on the willingness of the minor or his representative to
request a public trial from the judge: "If the child must bear the burden of asking for a public
hearing, the request may be construed as an implicit criticism of the judge's impartiality."
UA/ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 72 (citing Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court:
More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1186 (1966)). Both the NAC
STANDARDS, supra, at 328-29, and the IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 72-74, recognize that
further safeguards are appropriate. They suggest that the juvenile court judge should have
discretion to admit interested parties to a closed hearing, provided those parties agree not to
identify the juvenile. However, these standards leave the access decision to the discretion of
the juvenile court judge, which makes access uncertain. In contrast, recognition of a public
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tend to juveniles the right to a jury trial7° similarly magnifies the
need for public scrutiny to guard against judicial misconduct. These
features of the juvenile justice system suggest an especially strong
need for a first amendment right of access to juvenile delinquency
hearings.
In addition to its functional approach to the first amendment, the
Court undertook an historical analysis to support the right to attend
criminal trials, though history may play a more limited role in determining the scope of that right. 71 The history of juvenile delinquency
hearings fails to reveal a strong tradition of openness. Juvenile
courts have allowed varying degrees of public access since their inception.72 Yet, although juvenile proceedings do not share a long
tradition of openness with criminal trials, their history fails to reflect
a strong tradition of secrecy.73 The history of the juvenile justice
system, therefore, offers little guidance to resolution of the access
issue.
Further, history should play a limited role in defining the scope
of the right to attend judicial proceedings. Notwithstanding "the
favorable judgment of experience" and "the gloss of history" 74 that
the Constitution carries, the Court should avoid a rigid historical interpretation of the first amendment when the result would offend the
amendment's underlying purposes. Limiting the right of access to
proceedings that have historically been open to the public severely
right of access would help to ensure the presence of impartial observers. This would increase
the likelihood of a fair trial and the dissemination of information about the operation of the
juvenile court.
70. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971),
71. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
72. See CoSULICH, JUVENILE COURT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 50 (1939) (In 1939, six
states and the District of Columbia excluded the public from juvenile courts and twenty-four
states permitted excluding the public from the juvenile courtroom). Compare Tuthill, History
ofthe Children's Court in Chicago, in CHILDREN'S COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 701, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1904) [hereinafter cited as CHILDREN'S COURTS] (juvenile
hearing in open court), and Eliot, The Change Wrought by the Juvenile Probation System In SI.
Louis, in CHILDREN'S COURTS 162 (observers present in juvenile courtroom), with Murphy,
History ofthe Juvenile Court ofBujfalo, in CHILDREN'S COURTS 10 (only the "defendants, the
complainants, and the court officers and witnesses" were allowed at the trials.), and Lindsey,
Additional Report on Methods and Results, in CHILDREN'S COURTS 80 (juvenile cases heard on
Saturdays and after 5:00 P.M. during the week. The afternoon sessions were held in the
judge's chambers, "the probation officer being present with his reports, also the parents and
only those interested."). Bui see In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458, 464, 438 A.2d 1125, 1127 (1981) (denying public access to juvenile court proceedings citing a tradition of juvenile court closure),
73. The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on public access to places with a strong
tradition of secrecy. In each instance, the Court held that the restriction did not violate the
first amendment, as it protected a substantial government interest umelated to the suppression
of free expression. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Air Force base); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976) (Army base); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (state prison); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (county jail).
74. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2619 (quoting Richmond Newspaper v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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limits public "access to information about the operation of [the] government, including the Judicial Branch," 75 and impairs society's
ability to gather the information it needs for effective self-government. The checking value of the first amendment, moreover, would
suffer serious erosion if the government could pursue "policies and
practices that reduce the amount and quality of information disseminated to the public . . . simply because they serve the convenience,
or embody the traditional prerogatives, of the government." 76 Thus,
just as the Supreme Court refused to restrict the first amendment
right of peaceable assembly to only those places historically used for
the exercise of first amendment rights,77 the right of access to judicial
proceedings should not be limited only to those proceedings historically open to the public.

Ill.

COUNTERVAILING STATE INTERESTS

The right of access articulated in Richmond Newspapers and
Globe Newspaper is not absolute, but rather must yield when closure
would protect a compelling state interest.78 The state, however, must
show that "the denial [of access] is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 79
This Part considers whether the state's legitimate interests in preserving the environment of the juvenile court and the anonymity of
juveniles accused of crime amount to "an overriding interest articulated in fi.ndings," 80 and how the courts may most appropriately
"narrowly tailor" the denial of access to accommodate such an
interest.
15. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584 (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. Blasi, supra note 27, at 609-10.
77. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Supreme Court set forth its
doctrine governing the exercise of first amendment rights in public areas: "The nature of a
place, 'the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and
manner that are reasonable.' . . . The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is
basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." 408
U.S. at 116 (footnote omitted). Some co=entators suggest that this doctrine "provides the
most appropriate analogy for shaping a right of access test." See Kamisar, Right efAccess to
Ieformation Generated or Controlled by the Government: Richmond Newspapers Examined
and Gannett Revisited, in 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT:
TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980, at 145, 164-65 (1981); Note, The First Amendment
Right to Gather State-Held Ieformation, 89 YALE L.J. 923 (1980). In the context of juvenile
delinquency hearings, the "incompatibility" test would give the public a presumptive right to
attend the hearings. The court could close delinquency hearings only by demonstrating the
incompatibility of access with the normal activity of the juvenile court, given the particular
facts of the case. q: Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116; Kamisar,supra, at 164-65; Note,supra, at 93639. This test closely resembles the Globe Newspaper and Richmond Newspapers right of access
when applied to delinquency hearings. See notes 78-80 i'!fra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 13, 17 supra and accompanying text.
19. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2620.
SO. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion).
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A. Countervailing Interests
I. Intimate and Informal Juvenile Proceedings

States exclude the public from juvenile delinquency hearings in
part to ensure that they proceed in an informal, intimate, and protective setting. 81 Though some fear that a public right of access would
destroy this arrangement, 82 the benefits of access on the trial process
outweigh the marginal loss of intimacy.
Juvenile hearings cannot accurately be described as intimate.
Most state statutes allow the juvenile court judge to admit "interested parties" into the juvenile courtroom. 83 Although the definition
of "interested parties" varies from state to state, 84 students, social
workers, lawyers, and observers of the court system frequently attend juvenile delinquency hearings. 85 The presence of these persons86 ''vitiates the promise of confidentiality, without giving the
benefit of a truly open hearing." 87 Accordingly, the presence of several additional courtroom observers, some of whom may be reporters, would not significantly decrease the current level of intimacy in
juvenile court proceedings.
To the extent that the press fulfills its checking role, 88 however,
81. The Supreme Court has endorsed the ideal of an "intimate, informal protective proceeding" for the accused juvenile. See McKeiver v. Pehnsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
The language of many juvenile court statutes reveals that states use this ideal to justify closure
of delinquency hearings. See, e.g, ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.070 (1979) (court may conduct hearing in informal manner); HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 571-41 (Supp. 1980) (same); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419.498(1) (1981) (same).
82. See, eg., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (The Court expressed
concern that a trial by jury for juveniles would introduce ''the formality, and the clamor of the
adversary system and, possibly, the public trial" into the juvenile court system.).
83. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.§ 260.155(1) (1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 6336(d) (Purdon 1982); WYO. STAT. § 14-6-224(b) (1978).
84. Many states give the juvenile court judge discretion to admit persons having "a proper
interest in the proceedings or the work of the court." See, e.g., the statutes listed in note 83
supra. However, there are variations from state to state. Compare ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.070
(1979) (judge may admit individuals whose attendance is compatible with the minor's best
interests) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33 (1977) (judge may admit members of the "public
information" media to hearings concerning offenses that would have been felonies if committed by an adult).
85. See IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 69, at 71:
[B]ecause both model legislation and many state statutes allow for the presence of "interested persons" at the judge's discretion, ••• juvenile hearings cannot truly be described as
confidential. Frequent attendance by students, social workers, lawyers, and observers of
the court system indicates that one need not be "interested" in the child in order to qualify
as an "interested person."
86. The presence of "interested parties" at juvenile delinquency hearings may suggest that
a public right of access is unnecessary, as a sizeable audience already exists. However, the
presence of such individuals is entirely at the discretion of the judge in most states. See note 3
supra. Further, those admitted to the courtroom may not report information they obtain, thus
failing to fulfill the first amendment's structural role. See notes 19-30supra and accompanying
text.
87. IJA/ABA STANDARDS, supra note 69, at 71.
88. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
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juvenile hearings may not only become less intimate, but more formal as well. Public access to juvenile delinquency hearings would
cause juvenile court officials to adhere more closely to formalized
procedures in order to avoid the appearance of arbitrary conduct.
Such formality may undermine the delicate relationship between the
juvenile court judge and the erring youth. 89
Increased formality, however, will enhance the integrity of juvenile hearings. 90 The Supreme Court has criticized the procedural arbitrariness of juvenile courts, and has imposed a variety of due
process requirements on the juvenile justice system. 91 The Court has
recognized that imposition of due process requirements would increase the formality of the juvenile courtroom, yet has concluded
that more formal proceedings are consistent with the goals of the
juvenile justice system.92 Because the juvenile justice system often
bears a great resemblance to the criminal justice system,93 the juvenile courts, no less than the criminal courts, should employ "procedures designed to assure fair and reliable determinations." 94 A first
amendment right of access will help ensure that juveniles receive a
fair and reliable hearing.
Informal juvenile delinquency hearings, moreover, may mislead
juveniles and their parents into underestimating the seriousness of
the proceedings. 95 The juvenile may feel deceived when harsh discipline follows the procedural laxness of the parens patriae posture. 96
The juvenile, feeling unfairly treated, may resist rehabilitation,97
thus undermining the basic goal of the juvenile justice system. 98
89. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
90. q. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2620 (public access to criminal trials enhances quality of fact-finding process and fosters an appearance of fairness); Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 569-70 (plurality opinion) (public access to criminal trials may discourage perjury,
misconduct and biased decisions); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1947) (public trials
come to the attention of witnesses unknown to the parties, who may come forward and give
important testimony).
91. See note 6 supra.
92. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1967).
93. See notes 41-51 supra and accompanying text.
94. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 9.
95. See Comment, supra note 36, at 159 n.132 ("informal and confidential juvenile court
proceedings mislead minors and their parents into underestimating the seriousness of illegal
acts").
96. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,564 (1971) (appendix to dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.) (''The real traumatic experience is the ijuvenile's] feeling of being deprived
of basic rights."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967); Handler, The Juvenile Court and the
Adversary System: Problems ofFunction and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 7, 21 (''The word 'help,'
coming from such a person in a position of power, is, in the mind of the adolescent, a familiar
signal of danger.") (footnote omitted).
91. See JUVENILE DELINQUENCY - ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966), quoted in
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967); Handler, supra note 96, at 21; D. MATZA, supra note 40, at
101-51.
98. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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Recognition of a first amendment right of access to juvenile delinquency hearings would marginally decrease the intimacy of the
courtroom. The juvenile hearing would also become a more formal
proceeding. The juvenile justice system, however, will benefit from
increased procedural formality without sacrificing too much courtroom intimacy.
2. Public Ident!ftcation of Juvenile Delinquents

States justify closure of juvenile delinquency hearings in part because closure fulfills "the law's policy 'to hide youthful errors from
the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the
forgotten past.' " 99 Access to juvenile delinquency hearings enables
the press to publish the names of juvenile offenders 100 thus undermining the state's interest. Yet the harm sought to be avoided by
prohibiting publication of the juvenile offender's identity remains
speculative, while publication may in fact prove beneficial to society
and the particular juvenile offender. The Supreme Court, though
recognizing the legitimacy of the state's interest in closure, has held
that when the state's interest in confidentiality of a juvenile offender's identity conflicts with constitutional rights, the former must
yield.101
Although some alarmed observers argue that publicity and public identification would harm juvenile offenders, the harm attributable to a first amendment right of access would be minimal. First,
publicity could provide delinquents the attention they seek through
deviant behavior. Open hearings would "provide a deeply troubled
youngster an opportunity to flaunt his unregeneracy," 102 thus encouraging further delinquent acts. 103 However, it is not immediately
apparent that publicity would have this effect on the juvenile, and
99. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967).
100. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (state may not punish a
newspaper for publishing name of a juvenile offender when such information was lawfully
obtained); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (state may not
restrain the dissemination of information obtained at a juvenile delinquency hearing that was
open to the public). q: Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. S39, S68 (1976) ("[O]nce a
public hearing had been held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint.");
Cox: Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (197S) (broadcasting company may publicize
the lawfully obtained name of a rape victim because the state chose to place it in the public
domain by including it in court records open to the public).
101. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Davis v. Alaska, 41S U.S.
308 (1974) (defendant's right of confrontation guaranteed by the sixth amendment is paramount to the state's interest in protecting a juvenile offender's record).
102. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 42, at 38.
103. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Davis v. Alaska, 41S U.S. 308,319 (1974); Comment, supra note 36, at 15S; see also
Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individual/zed Justice, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 77S, 794 (1966).
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absent empirical support, 104 it is impossible to evaluate this argument meaningfully. Further, in those states that allow the juvenile
to open his delinquency hearing to the public, 105 a right of access
would not provide the juvenile with any additional opportunity for
attention.
Second, public information about juvenile court intervention
may "label" the juvenile offender. 106 According to the labeling hypothesis, individuals learn their personal identity from the reactions
they evoke from other members of society. By labeling a child "delinquent" in the public's eyes, juvenile court intervention causes the
child to view himself as an enemy of society. 107 This alienation arguably encourages further delinquent acts. 108 In addition to alienating the juvenile, the "delinquent" label would reduce the offender's
occupational and educational opportunities, further complicating
rehabilitation.109
It is unclear, however, how much labeling would result from
public access to delinquency hearings. Although the labeling hypothesis retains the support of many sociologists and social psychologists, 110 other studies suggest that the stigma of being classified a
delinquent has been overestimated. lll Nor does the incremental effect of publicity seem likely to intensify the psychological identifica104. See Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. RE.v. 101, 124
(1958), cited in RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 37 (Alaska 1971).
105. See note 3 supra.
106. See generally 1 NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, PREVENTING DELINQUENCY 135-52 (1977); Orlando & Black, Classification in
Juvenile Court: The JJelinquent Child in Need ofSupervision, Juv. JUST., May, 1974, at 13, 1922.
107. Orlando & Black, supra note 106, at 20 (quoting E. SCHUR, OUR CRIMINAL SOCIETY
117 (1969)).
108. Id.; see also Howard, Grisso & Neems, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 203, 204, 208-11 (1977). Although this article has been cited as empirical evidence of the harmful effects of publicity on juvenile offenders, it is based on a case study
of a single individual. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108 n.l (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); In re Robert M., 109 Misc. 2d 427, 432, 439 N.Y.S.2d 986, 990
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981).
109. See Lemert, The Juvenile Court- Quest and Realities, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 42, at 91, 92 (the stigma of juvenile court intervention "gets translated into effective
handicaps by heightened police surveillance, neighborhood isolation, lowered receptivity and
tolerance by school officials, and rejections of youth by prospective employers.").
110. See, e.g., M. FELDMAN, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 202-10
(1977); E. SCHUR, INTERPRETING DEVIANCE 156-61 (1979). But see THE LABELLING OF DEVIANCE (JI. Gove ed. 1975).
111. See Foster, Dinitz & Reckless, Perceptions ofStigma Following Public Intervention far
JJe/inquent Behavior, 20 Soc. PROBS. 202 (1972) (Only a small proportion of a group of delinquent boys felt seriously handicapped by their encounter with the police or juvenile court.
They perceived no substantial change in interpersonal relationships with family, friends, or
teachers. Their major fear was that a delinquency record would impair their ability to find a
job, and would cause the police to keep a close watch over them.); Jensen, JJe/inquency and
Adolescent Se!f-Conceptions: A Study of the Personal Relevance of Infraction, 20 Soc. PROBS.
84_ (1972) (although there is a tendency for those officially labeled "delinquent" to view them-
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tion process beyond the labeling influence of the legal proceedings
and records themselves. Similarly, it is unclear that access to juvenile hearings would decrease the occupational and educational opportunities of the juvenile offender. The FBI, the military,
government agencies and private employers currently may obtain information about an individual's juvenile court contacts. 112 Potential
employers, moreover, probably do not screen old newspaper files to
determine the criminal record of a youthful applicant. Absent personal recollection, the employer will only learn of a juvenile's record
through official or quasi-official channels. Thus, public access to juvenile delinquency hearings may contribute minimally, if at all, to
the juvenile's sense of alienation and loss of occupational and educational opportunities.
Publicity of juvenile court proceedings may also prove beneficial
to both the juvenile and society. First, the public has an interest in
learning the identity of the juvenile offender, just as with the criminal, in order to guard against further depredations. 113 Second, publicity of juvenile delinquency hearings may deter juvenile
delinquency. " 4 Such publicity may also alert the juvenile's parents, us as well as others, to their responsibilities toward their children. "6 In short, publicity surrounding juvenile delinquency
hearings may not harm the juvenile, and may, in fact, benefit both
the juvenile and society.
selves as delinquent, this tendency is far from perfect, varying according to race, economic
status, attachment to the law, and attachment to parents).
112. See note 48 supra and accompanying text. Also, employers and educational institutions desiring information about delinquency would probably seek out police and court
records rather than isolated newspaper reports. See Comment, supra note 36, al 157-58.
There is also some evidence that newspapers possessing the right to print the names ofjuvenile
offenders do so only very occasionally. See Conway, supra note 56, at 22.
113. See F. HAIMAN, supra note 26, at 373; Geis, Publication of the Names of Juven//e
Felons, 23 MONT. L. REv. 141, 152 (1962) ("A major reason advanced for the publication of
the names of offending delinquents is that such publication puts the community on guard
against further depredations by the youths."). Geis himself finds this approach "both shortsighted and illusory," for "the best protection to the community is not the immediate identification of the juvenile malefactor so that he can be shunned, but the reform of the offender so
that he can be trusted." Id. at 152-53.
114. See Geis, supra note 113, at 153-54. There is, however, little empirical support for
this assertion. Id. at 157. Geis explores the argument that publicizing juvenile offenders'
names will deter other youths from committing delinquent acts. This deterrence springs from
the youths' fear that their own names will end up in the newspaper, causing them to lose the
respect and emotional support of people who are important to them. Id. at 154.
115. Open juvenile delinquency proceedings, however, may excessively punish juveniles
and their parents. Public exposure could so embarrass the members of the juvenile's family
that they withhold their support in rehabilitative efforts. See In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458, 468, 438
A.2d 1125, 1129 (1981).
116. See Comment, supra note 36, at 162.
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B. Constitutional Restrictions on Access to Juvenile Court
Proceedings

Recognition of a first amendment right to attend juvenile delinquency hearings would not open all hearings to all people. As with
criminal trials, the right to attend juvenile delinquency hearings may
yield to "an overriding interest articulated in findings," 117 and is
subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions. This standard, set out in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, forbids
the mandatory or routine closure of juvenile hearings. Because "the
exclusionary provisions [of mandatory closure statutes] are triggered
without any finding of necessity, any examination of alternatives, or
any limitations on the closure order to exclude only those persons at
only those times as is necessary to fulfill policies underlying the statute,"118 such provisions are overbroad and unconstitutionally restrict
first amendment rights. 119 Similarly, statutes that permit routine closure of juvenile trials, without the deliberate and careful weighing of
interests envisioned by Richmond Newspapers, cannot survive a first
amendment challenge. Thus, the juvenile court judge must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the presence of courtroom observers would interfere with the administration of justice. 120
1. Potentially Compelling State Interests

Two potential state interests might justify restricting access to juvenile court proceedings. First, when courtroom observers pose the
risk of disrupting the orderly administration of justice, the juvenile
court judge may impose reasonable limitations on access to ensure
"the fair administration of justice ... [and] a quiet and orderly setting" for trial. 121 If the number of observers is inconsistent with a
quiet and orderly setting, or if the presence of the media would
amount to an undue intrusion into the juvenile hearings, 122 the judge
117. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 (plurality opinion).
I 18. Note, Evaluating Court Closures After Richmond Newspapers: Using Sixth Amendment Standards to Eeforce a First Amendment Right, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 304, 322 (1982)
(footnote omitted).
119. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
120. q. Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2621:
[A)s compelling as [the state's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor witness) is, it does not justify a mandatory-closure rule, for it is clear
that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest. A
trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to protect
the welfare of a minor victim. Among the factors to be weighed are the minor victim's
age, psychological maturity, and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the
victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.
(Emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
121. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion).
122. Recognition of the right of the press and public to attend delinquency hearings would
not necessarily result in more intrusive forms of access, such as television coverage of the
hearings. While this Note advocates recognition of a constitutional right of access to delin-
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may impose reasonable restrictions on access to the juvenile courtroom. Thus, a right of access need not interfere with the functions of
the juvenile court. 123
Second, the court may restrict access to the courtroom upon articulating an overriding interest in closure. As required by Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, these findings must relate to the
particular circumstances of the case at issue. For example, a judge
may close a delinquency hearing upon a showing that the particular
juvenile before the court would be unduly inhibited by the presence
of courtroom observers, thus precluding free and open communication with the judge. 124 Similarly, if the judge finds public identification would seriously harm the particular offender, he may exclude
the public from the hearing. 125 Absent such a finding, the first
amendment requires that the juvenile courtroom remain open to the
public.
2. Narrowly Tailoring Restrictions on Access
The Supreme Court has held that absent a particular, articulated
compelling state interest to the contrary, courts cannot exclude the
public from criminal trials. 126 Even in the presence of such an interest, the restriction imposed must be narrowly tailored to minimize its
restriction of first amendment rights. 127 When a juvenile court judge
quency hearings, there is no constitutional right to televise trials. See Marcus, The Media in the
Courtroom: Attending, Reporting, Televising Criminal Cases, S7 IND, L.J. 23S, 28S (1982),
Thus, states would not be forced to allow television coverage in the absence of overriding
contradictory state interests. However, the Supreme Court has held that states may choose to
televise the criminal trials of adults, absent a showing by the defendant that electronic cover•
age would compromise his right to a fair trial. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. S60 (1981).
In the context of delinquency hearings, the Court could find that television is so inimical to the
intimacy and confidentiality interests of the juvenile court that it constitutes a per se violation
of juveniles' due process rights. Alternatively, the Court could permit states to televise delinquency hearings absent a showing of prejudice by the juvenile. The implications of the latter
approach are unclear, as it is difficult to predict how many states would choose to televise their
delinquency hearings.
123. See note 77 supra.
124. The juvenile court judge would conduct an inquiry into the facts and circumstances of
a case to determine whether courtroom closure is necessary.
[R]epresentatives of the press and general public must be given an opportunity to be
heard on the question of their exclusion. This does not mean, however, that for purposes
of this inquiry the court cannot protect the minor . . . by denying these representatives
the opportunity to confront or cross-examine the [minor], or by denying them access to
sensitive details concerning the (minor] . . . .
Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2622 n.2S (citation omitted). The judge would then balance the
need for closure in an individual case against the presumptive right of public access to the
hearing, and articulate his decision in written findings.
12S. See note 124 supra.
126. See notes 9-18 supra and accompanying text.
127. The proscription against overbreadth in legislation affecting first amendment rights is
well established. The Court sometimes rejects legislation as overbroad because the means employed by the state are not sufficiently related to the interests it sought to implement, or because the state interest itself failed to justify restrictions on expression. See NAACP v.
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does articulate a legitimately compelling interest in restricting access,
what procedure satisfies such an interest with the least damage to the
public right of access? The two basic alternatives are denying access
itself, or conditioning access on the future conduct of those admitted.
The former approach offers less information to the public, while the
latter invites serious conflict with the law of prior restraints, the very
foundation of first amendment doctrine.
a. Denial ofaccess. A court can limit the first amendment costs
of denying access in two ways. First, if a judge closes a hearing, the
closure order should extend only to that portion of the hearing in
which the state's interest justifies overriding the first amendment
right of access. 128 Second, the court should make available transcripts of the closed proceedings, with whatever excisions the particular compelling interest dictates in that case. 129
This approach does not completely satisfy the first amendment
interest in public access. The checking value concept follows from a
distrust of what the government chooses to reveal about itself; an
edited after-the-fact account provided by the court itself does little to
strengthen public scrutiny of its operations. Nor does a transcript
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-44 (1963); Israel,
Elfbrandt v. Russell: The Demise ofthe Oath?, 1966 SuP. CT. Rev. 193, 217-18. In other cases,
even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth oflegislative abridgment must be viewed in the
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (footnote omitted). Moreover, "a litigant whose
own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court." Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980); see also Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981). The Court recognizes that "[a]pplication
of the overbreadth doctrine in this manner is, manifestly, strong medicine." Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973). However, "[i]t has long been recognized that the First
Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn . . . ." 413 U.S. at 611. See generally
Monaghan, Overhreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. Rev. I; Note, The First Amendment Overhreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. Rev. 844 (1970); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
128. Newman v. Graddick, 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1104, 1108 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[i]f
closure is warranted, the restriction on access must be narrowly drawn with only that part of
the proceeding as is necessary closed"); see notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text.
129. See Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2625 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (transcript availability minimizes the effect on the first amendment interest); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 400 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) ("because exclusion is justified only as a protection of the defendant's right to a fair trial and the State's interest in confidentiality, members of
the press and public objecting to the exclusion have the right to demand that it extend no
farther than is likely to achieve these goals. Thus, for example, the trial court should not
withhold the transcript of closed courtroom proceedings past the time when no prejudice is
likely to result to the defendant or the State from its release."); Poughkeepsie Newspapers v.
Rosenblatt, 9 Meo. L. REP. (BNA) 1362, 1363 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (per curiam) (''where
closure is required, its duration should be as limited as circumstances allow with a view toward
causing the minimum possible impact upon the public's right to be informed").
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capture with complete effectiveness the full reality of the proceeding,
the atmosphere of the courtroom or the demeanor of the witnesses.
As Justice Brennan observed in Richmond Newspapers, a "transcript
is no substitute for a public presence at the trial itself." 130 Similarly,
the Globe Newspaper Court favored the right of access over the rape
victim's privacy notwithstanding the contemporaneous availability
of transcripts. 131 Thus, while the provision of transcripts minimizes
the first amendment interest sacrificed by closure, and therefore is
constitutionally required by the need to "narrowly tailor" any access
restriction, 132 alternatives arguably more consistent with the right of
access deserve consideration.
b. Conditional access. One possible resolution of the conflict
between state interests in confidential juvenile delinquency hearings
and the first amendment right of access to criminal trials is conditional access: individuals could be admitted to the courtroom on the
condition that they not divulge or publicize the proceeding's most
sensitive aspect (e.g. , the offender's identity). 133 This approach
would ensure the public's presence in the courtroom without surrendering the state's compelling interest in nondisclosure. But this approach involves forbidding reporters from publishing what they
have legally learned, implicating the first amendment's profound antipathy to prior restraints. 134
130. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 597 n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring). Bui cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 376-77 & n.4 (1979) (jurisdiction not defeated, although
case perhaps "technically moot," when press given transcript of pretrial supression hearing
after defendants pied guilty to lesser included offenses); 443 U.S. at 393 (after transcript was
furnished, the "press and the public then had a full opportunity to scrutinize the suppression
hearing. . . . Under these circumstances, and First and Fourteenth Amendment right . . . to
attend a criminal trial was not violated.").
13 l. The majority in Globe Newspaper deemed the closure statute unconstitutional, implicitly rejecting the dissent's argument that transcript availability negated the first amendment
interest in access to the proceeding itself. See note 129 supra.
132. Of course, the transcript can be edited to the extent minimally sufficient to protect the
compelling state interest. See Poughkeepsie Newspapers v. Rosenblatt, 9 MEDIA L. REP,
(BNA) 1362, 1364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (per curiam) ("Consistent with the view that any
interference with the freedom of the press and the public's right to know should be held to the
absolute minimum necessary to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial, a transcript of the
hearing, redacted so as lo exclude mallerspertaining lo evidence which the respondent Justice has
ruled to be inadmissible at trial, should immediately be made available to the press.") (emphasis added).
133. See In re B.P., 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1151 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1983) (admitting media
representatives on condition that no facial picture of juvenile be taken or broadcast, on pain of
contempt).
134. See note lOOsupra. Bui see Brian W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 618,623 n.6, 574
P.2d 788, 791 n.6, 143 Cal. Rptr. 717, 720 n.6 (1977) (conditional access distinguished from
prior restraint by limitation of the restraining order to information denied from the closed
hearing itself; constitutionality of conditional access therefore an open question). Cf. Globe
Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2623 n.l (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("It is clear that the victims would
'waive' the exclusion of the press only if the trial court gave them guarantees of strict privacy,
guarantees . . . which themselves would raise grave constitutional problems.") (citing Ne-
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Several considerations, however, distinguish conditional access
from prior restraints. First, conditional access does not prohibit the
press from publishing information per se; rather, publication of an
offender's name would be forbidden only if the press obtained the
information from the courtroom. 135 A regime of conditional access
could therefore still preserve the constitutionally crucial distinction
between access regulation (the negative retention of information)
from censorship (the affirmative suppression of information).
The distinction appears more clearly upon an examination of the
effects of conditional access and prior restraint. Clas~ic prior restraints diminish the flow of information to the public. 136 In stark
contrast, conditional access maximizes the fl.ow of information to the
braska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975)).
On the constitutional repugnance of prior restraints, see New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S.
415 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
135. This difference distinguishes conditional access from the prior restraint struck down
in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979), and Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). In Smith, the state statute required court
approval prior to publication of a juvenile offender's name. The reporters "obtained the name
of the alleged assailant simply by asking various witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney who were at the school" after the shooting took place. 443 U.S. at 99. In
Oklahoma Publishing, the juvenile's name was learned at an open detention hearing, and
widely publicized prior to a gag order issued at a subsequent closed arraignment hearing. The
order purported to apply to subsequent republication of an identity obtained independently of
the closed proceeding. 430 U.S. at 309. See also Globe Newspaper, 102 S. Ct. at 2628 & n.l
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the right of access is plainly not coextensive with the right of expression that was vindicated in [Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)]; [f]or example, even though a reporter may have no right of access to a judge's side-bar conference, it
surely does not follow that the judge could enjoin publication of what a reporter might have
learned about such a conference."); Gannett, 443 U.S. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring) (courtroom closures that deny the press access to only one source are distinguishable from "classic
prior restraint(s)" such as gag orders which tell the press what it may or may not publish);
Brian W. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 618, 574 P.2d 788, 143 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1977):
In both [Oklahoma Publishing and Cox Broadcasting] the court significantly emphasized that it was confronted with public business, a public event, or official records open to
public inspection. Though prior restraints on publication always demand a heavy burden
ofjustification (Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart (1976) 427 U.S. 539, 556-561, 96 S.Ct. 2791,
49 L.Ed.2d 683), the absolute ban on such restraints in Oklahoma Publishing and Cox
applies only to information already in the public domain. The holdings in these cases,
then, do not necessarily extend to juvenile court hearings that are not open to the public,
but which media representatives are conditionally permitted to attend.
20 Cal. 3d at 624 n.6, 574 P.2d at 791 n.6, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 720 n.6. Professor Tribe has argued
that prohibiting publication of information "about this trial" is a broad restriction on the press
that can be distinguished from prohibiting publication of a specific trial document or closing
the courtroom. He labels the current Supreme Court approach to access - allowing courtroom closures but prohibiting almost any restrictions on dissemination of information already
in the hands of the press - a "foolish rule." In his view, closing the courtroom is indistinguishable from prohibiting publication of information obtained from the court. Tribe, Richmond Newspapers: A Panel Discussion, in 2 J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980, 184-87 (1981). Doctrinally, such
a distinction is justified by the journalist's consent to the conditions imposed, and the net
increment in public information fostered by conditional access.
136. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commn. on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
390 (1973) (''The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed,
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public. The conditionally admitted observer remains "free to describe the details of the offense and inform the community of the
proceedings against the juvenile." 137 Rigid application of the prior
restraint doctrine to conditional access yields the anomalous result of
restricting the fl.ow of information to the public.
Finally, an innovative procedural approach to conditional access
might overcome the doctrinal problem altogether. In Snepp v. United
States, 138 the Supreme Court interpreted a contract between the
Central Intelligence Agency and one of its agents, providing for prepublication review by the Agency of any material the agent might
later prepare for the public relating to his service with the Agency, as
imposing a constructive trust on the revenues derived from a book
published in violation of the contract. The trust was deemed for the
interest of the government, and the revenue from Snepp's book reverted to the CIA. In reaching this result, the Court dismissed
Snepp's first amendment arguments in a footnote. 139 Given the government's compelling interest in the security of intelligence activities,
"[t]he agreement that Snepp signed is a reasonable means for protecting this vital interest." 140
The Court left unclear the force of a nondisclosure contract absent a compelling interest in secrecy. But since the right of access
declared in Richmond Newspapers and Globe Newspaper permits access restrictions only when the government demonstrates such an interest, a contractual approach to access regulation appears to be
sanctioned by Snepp. The damage problems that persuaded the
Snepp Court to impose a constructive trust may present some obstacles to such an approach. 141 But an appropriately drafted provision
for liquidated damages could overcome this difficulty. 142 Individuals admitted to a juvenile court proceeding, pursuant to a contract
with the court not to disseminate particular information disclosed at
the hearing, would then become liable for a fixed sum of damages
either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment.").
137. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
138. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
139. See 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
140. 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
141. The Court was concerned that the dangers ofunreviewed disclosure were genuine but
unquantifiable, and might require proof of the very facts the government desired to keep secreL See 444 U.S. at 514-16.
142. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981); id., § 356, Comment b
(''The greater the difficulty either of proving that loss had occurred or of establishing its
amount ... the easier it is to show that the amount fixed is reasonable."). The parties in
Snepp did not contractually provide for liquidated damages. The requirement of a compelling
state interest before any access restriction becomes constitutional under Globe Newspaper and
Richmond Newspapers should dispel any apprehension that such a contractual approach will
become so widely used as to threaten, rather than foster, the free flow of information,
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upon proof of a breach of the contract. Conditional access would
then amount to no more of a "prior restraint" than the contract the
Court enforced in Snepp.
CON~LUSION

The first amendm~nt right to attend criminal trials should extend
to juvenile delinquency hearings. Public access to these hearings
would fulfill the first amendment's structural role of ensuring a free
flow of information necessary to effective self-government, and of
checking the abuse of official power. Although the state has a legitimate interest in the confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings, this
interest does not justify the mandatory or routine closure of juvenile
delinquency hearings. The judge may, however, impose reasonable
restriction on access to the juvenile courtroom upon a showing that
an "overriding interest articulated in findings" justifies an infringement of first amendment rights. Conditional access offers the restriction on first amendment tights most narrowly tailored to the
protection of such a compelling interest. Courts wary of the doctrinal challenges posed by such an approach should, at a minimum,
close only the portion of the proceeding implicating the overriding
interest, and make available contemporaneous transcripts of any
closed proceedings.

